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Abstract
In this paper, I test the hypothesis that anti-predatory lending laws inhibited the
volume of mortgage lending during the housing-bubble period. I use cross-state varia-
tion in the strictness of these laws and their application only to mortgage refinancing as
opposed to home purchases to develop a difference-in-difference estimate of the impact
of these laws on mortgage volume. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that states
with stricter laws had lower mortgage refinancing volume but exhibited no difference
in home purchase mortgage volume. I also test whether by restricting mortgage refi-
nancing, these laws impacted household expenditures and find that the laws reduced
household expenditures.
∗I thank my advisor, Harrison Hong, for invaluable advice and support. I am also grateful to seminar
participants at Princeton University for helpful comments. All errors are my own.
†Address: The Bendheim Center for Finance, 26 Prospect Ave, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
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1. Introduction
In this paper, I test the impact of anti-predatory lending laws, examining 1) whether the laws
inhibited mortgage volume, especially in mortgage refinancing, during the housing-bubble
period and 2) whether restricted mortgage refinancing as a result of these laws reduced
household consumption. Predatory mortgage lending has been generally defined as a variety
of unfair or deceitful lending practices, directed at “vulnerable populations,” that often result
in serious personal losses, including bankruptcy and foreclosure. Predatory lending practices
in the home mortgage market have grown with mortgage credit expansion.
To cope with increasing evidence of predatory lending practices, Congress enacted the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 1994. However, HOEPA was not
sufficient to curb predatory lending in the mortgage market. Consequently, starting with
North Carolina in 1999, many states enacted laws limiting predatory mortgage lending. As
of January 2007, 31 states and the District of Columbia had anti-predatory lending laws in
effect. I use cross-state variation in the strictness of these laws to test hypothesis.
The impact of anti-predatory lending laws is a little-studied but important question,
since the laws are closely connected to the three characteristic features of the recent housing
crisis. Specifically, during the housing-bubble period, loose lending standards caused exces-
sive mortgage lending.1 The extended credit was heavily concentrated on the populations
who were the most liquidity-constrained, such as racial minorities, the elderly, and the un-
educated.2 Finally, the “refinancing rachet effect,” meaning the asymmetry in refinancing
activity against the home price change, played a critical role in the recent crisis.3 Since
anti-predatory lending laws were designed to impose stricter lending standards on high-cost
loans, especially on mortgage refinancing, and the targets of predatory lending coincided
1See Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laevan (2009), Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010),
and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) regarding the loose lending standards.
2See Mian and Sufi (2009) and Rugh and Massey (2010) regarding the concentrated mortgage lending to
vulnerable populations.
3Khandani, Lo, and Merton (2010) found that the asymmetry in refinancing mortgages played a critical
role in the crisis: the partial extraction of home equity is possible when home prices appreciate, but the
partial liquidation of homes is not possible when home prices drop.
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with the populations with extended credit, the role of anti-predatory lending laws during
the housing-bubble period is expected to be significant. In fact, major settlements on abusive
lending allegations in recent years hint at the extent of predatory lending and the application
of the laws (U.S. General Accounting Office (2004)). In 2002, Household International4 paid
a $484 million settlement on allegations that it used unfair and deceptive lending practices.
Citigroup also paid a $240 million settlement in 2002 alleging that subsidiaries of Citibank5
engaged in systematic and widespread abusive lending practices.
Anti-predatory lending laws are different from traditional usury laws because they do not
impose any interest ceiling, but rather, require stricter lending standards on high-cost loans.
HOEPA was the first anti-predatory lending law and the prototype for state anti-predatory
lending laws. HOEPA applied to closed-end loans secured by the borrower’s principal res-
idence, and did not cover home purchase loans. Once a loan met the criteria for HOEPA,
lenders had to provide more detailed disclosures to the borrower. Under HOEPA, balloon
payments, negative amortization, prepayment penalties, and loan flipping were partially
or fully restricted. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae), were not allowed to purchase mortgage loans covered under HOEPA.
Since HOEPA was deemed insufficient to curb abusive practices, many states enacted laws
limiting predatory mortgage lending to fill HOEPA’s gaps. State anti-predatory lending laws
followed HOEPA’s structure but employed varying levels of strictness based on their own
interests. As a result, state laws varied in the strictness of their provisions. Common HOEPA
structure makes it convenient to compare the strictness of the laws across the states.
I use cross-state variation in the strictness of these laws and their application only to
mortgage refinancing as opposed to home purchases to develop a difference-in-difference
estimate of the impact of these laws on mortgage volume. Since the laws applied only to
4Household International, Inc. was the oldest, as well as the second largest, consumer finance company
in the United States. On March 28, 2003, HSBC acquired Household International, which was merged in
2005 with a subsidiary company of HSBC that became the HSBC Finance Corp.
5Associates First Capital Corporation and Associates Corporation of North America
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mortgage refinancing and not to home purchases, but the predatory lending occurred in both
markets, a stark contrast between the two markets will identify the laws’ effect by using the
home purchase market as a control group.
I use the anti-predatory lending (APL) law index from the Corporation for Enterprise
Development (CFED), a nonprofit organization that evaluates state policies, to evaluate the
strictness of the various state laws. I use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act– the
most comprehensive data on home mortgage origination– for mortgage origination.
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that states with stricter laws had lower mortgage
refinancing volume but exhibited no difference in home purchase mortgage volume. On aver-
age, a unit increase in the APL law index raises the mortgage denial rate by 0.43%, decreases
the amount of mortgage originations by 2.85%, and decreases the number of mortgage ap-
plications by 1.69% when all other variables are held constant. Considering that the APL
law index ranges from 0 to 12, the results show significant reduction in refinancing volume in
states with the strictest laws. The economic significance of the APL law index is also large.
Whether the reduction in mortgage volume comes solely from inhibited predatory loans
remains as an empirical question. In principle, the anti-predatory lending laws can also
inhibit legitimate high-cost loans. Previous studies on the laws’ effect showed that the
reduction in subprime mortgage volume mostly came from high-cost loans with predatory
terms (Elliehausen, Staten, and Steinbuks (2006); Li and Ernst (2007)). I also find that
the reduction in mortgage refinancing volume becomes larger as the Loan-to-Income ratio
increases. Considering that the Loan-to-Income ratio is one of the frequently used proxy
measure for riskiness of loans, this result shows that the laws have been more influential on
loans with higher risk characteristics.
I also test whether by restricting mortgage refinancing, these laws impacted household
expenditures. The wealth effect of housing value is limited by the novel nature of the housing
asset, that is, people have to live somewhere. Increased home equity can be realized mainly
through mortgage refinancing. Mian and Sufi (2011) found that money extracted through
3
refinancing was not used for the repayment of existing debts, and concluded that the money
was used for “real outlays” such as consumption or home improvements.
I use the result that the laws inhibited the mortgage refinancing volume to estimate a
reduced form model for the APL laws’ effect on household expenditures. Again, I use the
CFED law index for law strictness and use the Consumer Expenditure Survey by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics for household expenditures. I find that strict APL laws are significantly
associated with the reduction in total expenditures. On average, a unit increase in the
law index reduces total expenditures by $754 when all other variables are held constant.
Moreover, reductions are also found in various categories of expenditures, including Food,
Housing, Transportation, and Personal Insurance and Pensions. On average, a unit increase
in the law index reduces annual expenditures on Housing by $273.1, Transportation by $173,
Personal Insurance and Pensions by $92.75, and Food by $64.08.
Next, I instrument the amount of origination (AMTO) in mortgage refinancing with
the APL law index to conduct IV analysis. I find that the instrumented AMTO increases
total household expenditures. Many of the categories of expenditures increased as well.
This indicates that a significant portion of household expenditures have been increased by
extended mortgage refinancing availability in states with weak APL laws. Since the APL
laws discipline the mortgage refinancing market by restricting excessive lending, the extra
expenditures must have been unsustainable without the influx of home equity dollars.
This paper contributes to the policy literature regarding the effect of anti-predatory
lending laws on mortgage volume. While I focus on the laws’ effect on mortgage refinancing
volume, overall subprime mortgage volume has been a main focus of other studies. Starting
with an evaluation of the North Carolina anti-predatory lending law, national-level studies
followed as the number of states with such laws increased. Although the results vary with
data and sample periods6, there is a consensus that subprime applications and originations
6For analyzing the NC law’s effect, different data sets with different sample periods are used in the studies.
The HMDA data is used by Harvey and Nigro (2004) (1998-2000) and Burnett, Finkel, and Kaul (2004) (1997-
1998, 2000-2002). Subprime loans in the HMDA data are identified using the HUD list of subprime lenders.
Elliehausen and Staten (2004) use the subprime data from the American Financial Services Association
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decline with APL law adoption, especially among lower-income borrowers, minority groups,
and non-bank subprime lenders. In addition, significant reductions are found in the volume
of high-cost loans and loans with predatory terms.
This paper also contributes to the literature regarding the wealth effect of housing value
on household consumption. Since rising home values also increase the user cost of housing, a
direct wealth effect of housing on household consumption has been denied in previous liter-
ature.7 However, Muellbauer (2008) finds that the home equity market plays a pivotal role
on the housing wealth effect, through mobilizing increased home equity. In addition, Cooper
(2009) finds that the wealth effect appears only among budget-constrained households. Hurst
and Stafford (2004) also find that liquidity-constrained households convert two-thirds of ev-
ery dollar from home equity extraction into consumption. This paper complements previ-
ous studies regarding the wealth effect on household consumption, by analyzing the effect
of various state laws that seek to control mortgage refinancing volume, especially toward
predatory-targeted populations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the state anti-predatory
lending laws and analyzes the various indices for the cross-state law variation; Section 3
explains and summarizes the data; Section 4 reports the results regarding the effect of
anti-predatory lending laws on home mortgage origination; Section 5 reports the results
regarding the effects of anti-predatory lending law on household expenditure; Section 6
provides additional discussions; Section 7 concludes.
(1995-2000) and Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2004) use the Loan Performance data (1998-2002). For
the national-level studies, the HMDA data is used by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) and Bostic et al.
(2008). Elliehausen, Staten, and Steinbuks (2006) use proprietary data on subprime mortgages by the
subprime subsidiaries of eight large financial institutions from 1997 to 2004. Li and Ernst (2007) use the
Loan Performance data on securitized subprime loans from 1998 to 2005.
7Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005); Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2009); Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek
(2011). See Peek (2010) for detailed literature review.
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2. The Anti-Predatory Lending Law
Home mortgage loans are types of loan that are collateralized by the value of the underlying
residential property. Homes account for a large part of household wealth but are normally
illiquid and indivisible assets. Mobilizing home equity is important for households’ lifetime
consumption smoothing, especially for those who are liquidity-constrained. In fact, home
mortgage loans are one of the most commonly used financial products in the United States.
Predatory lending has been generally defined as a variety of unfair or deceitful lending
practices, aimed at “vulnerable populations”, that result in serious personal losses, including
bankruptcy and foreclosure.8 Quantifying the extent of predatory lending is impracticable
due to the absence of a precise definition of the term, since the abusiveness of any particular
loan depends on the overall context of the loan and the borrowers. However, major settle-
ments on abusive lending allegations in recent years hint at the extent of predatory lending
(U.S. General Accounting Office (2004)). For example, in October 2002, Household Interna-
tional9 paid a $484 million settlement on allegations by attorneys general in 46 states that
it used unfair and deceptive lending practices. In September 2002, Citigroup paid a $240
million settlement on charges by the Federal Trade Commission and private parties alleging
that Associates First Capital Corporation and Associates Corporation of North America,
subsidiaries of Citibank, engaged in systematic and widespread abusive lending practices.
Predatory lending in the home mortgage market emerged after the deregulations of 1980s.
Originally, state usury law regulated home mortgage loans as a part of consumer loans. Usury
laws, which prohibited any loans with interest rates higher than the usury ceiling, caused an
insufficient credit supply in the mortgage market. Credit shortages increased when interest
8The formal definition of predatory lending can be found in Engel and McCoy (2002). They defined
predatory lending as “a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that involve one or more of the following
five problems: 1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; 2) harmful
rent seeking; 3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices; 4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans
that are not actionable as fraud; and 5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.”
9Household International, Inc. was the oldest, as well as the second largest, consumer finance company
in the United States. On March 28, 2003, HSBC acquired Household International, which was merged in
2005 with a subsidiary company of HSBC that became the HSBC Finance Corp.
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rates rose significantly during late 1970s.10
Because the home mortgage market was important for households and their secured na-
ture was different from the other consumer loans, deregulations in the home mortgage market
continued from late 1970s into the early 1980s. As part of the deregulation, home mortgages
were exempted from state usury laws, and the use of alternative mortgage transactions was
allowed.11 Home mortgage loans with high interest rates and alternative mortgage features
such as adjustable rates or balloon payments became possible, including predatory home
mortgage lending.
Behind the deregulation, there was a firm belief in the market. If mortgage lenders
competed and households were informed enough to choose the best deal between different
products, the market would price mortgage products properly without any legal guidance.
To allow for comparison by borrowers, the Truth in Lending Act of 1968, or TILA, required
disclosures about terms and the cost of mortgage loans. However, the TILA was not manda-
tory and additional regulation was needed to curb increasing predatory lending practices.
The Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: Federal and State
In 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, or HOEPA,
amending TILA to deal with increasing predatory lending practices in the home equity
market. HOEPA was the first comprehensive anti-predatory lending law that applied to
closed-end loans secured by a borrower’s principal residence, other than home purchase loans.
HOEPA regulated “high-cost loans”, which were loans exceeding one of the following two
triggers: (1) the annual percentage rate (APR) exceeded the yield on comparable Treasury
10For example, the federal funds rate was 5.54% in 1977, 7.94% in 1978. By 1979 it jumped up to 11.2%,
in 1980 it was 13.35%, and in 1981 it was 16.39%. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
11The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 preempted state usury ceil-
ings from any mortgage secured by a first lien on residential property. The Alternative Mortgage Transaction
Parity Act of 1982 preempted the state statues that restricted the use of alternative mortgage transactions,
such as adjustable rate mortgage, balloon payments and negative amortization, from the loans secured by
residential property. These deregulations ultimately set the stage for the subprime home equity industry
today. More details can be found in Mansfield (2000).
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securities plus 8%12(10%) for first-lien (subordinate-lien) loans; or (2) total points and fees
exceeded the greater of 8% of the total amount of the mortgage or a set dollar amount ($592
for 201113).
Once a loan met the criteria for HOEPA, lenders must provide more detailed disclo-
sures in addition to those required by TILA. Further, some loan features were partially
or fully restricted, including balloon payments, negative amortization, prepayment penal-
ties, and loan flipping.14 Lenders were not permitted to originate mortgage loans based on
the value of the collateral but were required to check a borrower’s repayment ability. The
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Freddie Mac) or the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), were not
allowed to purchase mortgage loans that fell under HOEPA.
However, the federal regulation was not sufficient to curb ongoing predatory practices in
mortgage markets.15 Some critics have charged that the triggers for the high-cost loans in
HOEPA were too high. Facing problems with growing predatory mortgage lending, states
started to enact anti-predatory lending laws to bolster consumer protection from these preda-
tory practices. Starting in North Carolina in 1999, laws limiting predatory mortgage lending
were adopted. As of January 2007, 31 states and the District of Columbia had anti-predatory
lending laws in effect.
For their own anti-predatory lending laws, states followed HOEPA’s structure but em-
ployed varying levels of strictness based on their own standards. As a result, the strictness of
anti-predatory lending laws differs by state. For example, in North Carolina’s anti-predatory
lending law, the APR trigger remained the same as HOEPA, but the trigger for points and
fees was reduced from 8% of the total amount to 5% for loans under $20,000. North Car-
12The APR trigger for first-lien was 10% in original HOEPA. But it has been lowered to 8% in the
amendment of 2002.
13Exact dollar amounts are adjusted annually, based on the Consumer Price Index.
14Balloon payments for loans with less than five-year terms were restricted. Refinancing within twelve
months without the best interest of borrowers (loan flipping) and prepayment penalties beyond five years
after origination were banned. Negative amortization and due-on demand clause were fully restricted.
15See the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000) on the continuing predatory lending
practices after HOEPA.
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olina’s anti-predatory lending law also prohibited balloon payments for all high-cost loans,
while HOEPA only banned balloon payments for loans with less than five-year terms. Con-
sequently, the North Carolina anti-predatory lending law covers a larger group of mortgages
than HOEPA, with tighter restrictions.
Indices for the State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
To capture the cross-state variation of the law strictness on predatory mortgage lending,
quantitative law indices have been developed in earlier studies. Indices measured the strict-
ness of state laws relative to HOEPA. However, due to the complexity in the law variations,
creating a quantitative index of a qualitative law is far from simple. Accordingly, previous
law indices showed significant differences. In this section, I review the indices in previous
studies and examine the differences between the indices. Three different indices by state are
reported in panel A in Table 1. The Summary statistics of the indices are reported in panel
B.
In the first index, the Corporation for Enterprise Development16 (CFED) rated the
strength of state regulations on curbing predatory lending based on information obtained
from the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL)17. CFED evaluated eight features of state
anti-predatory lending (APL) laws as they existed in 2007. Those features were: 1) the type
of loans covered; 2) points and fees triggers; 3) substantive legal protections; 4) remedies
available to borrowers; 5) the regulations on loan-flipping; 6) prepayment penalties and; 7)
sound underwriting.18 The CFED Index was the sum of the scores of the eight law features.
16The Corporation for Enterprise Development is a national nonprofit organization based in Washington,
DC. CFED publishes research, partners with local practitioners to carry out demonstration projects and
engages in policy advocacy work at the local, state and national levels. CFED provides state policy measures
on various subjects. More details can be found at http://scorecard.cfed.org/.
17The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) is a nonprofit , non-partisan research and policy group based
in Durham, North Carolina, and with offices in Washington, DC and Oakland, California. Its purpose is to
educate the public about financial products and to advocate for policies that curb predatory lending. CRL
is affiliated with the Center for Community Self-Help.
18The CFED Index was constructed by a method analogous to the method used by Li and Ernst (2007)(LE
Index). Li and Ernst (2007) ranked state APL laws according to six criteria including the type of loans
covered, points and fees triggers, substantive legal protections, and remedies available to borrowers. Two
more criteria were added to the CFED Index, in addition to the six criteria of the LE Index. The CFED
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Column (1) in Table 1.A reports the CFED Index. North Carolina, New Mexico, and Mas-
sachusetts were in the group of strict APL law states. In contrast, Arizona, California, and
Nevada were in the group of weak APL law states.
In the second index, Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) developed a two-component index
of state APL laws as they existed in 2005. Hereafter, the index will be denoted as the
HP Index. The HP Index consisted of two subindices: 1) the Coverage Index and; 2)
the Restriction Index. The Coverage Index measured the breadth of law coverage, and
the Restriction Index measured the strictness of law restriction. The Coverage Index was
defined as the sum of ratings in four criteria regarding the coverage of the law. The criteria
for law coverage included the type of loans covered, APR triggers, and points and fees
triggers. Each criterion was rated by the relative strictness of the state law to HOEPA.
Construction of the Restriction Index was similar to the Coverage Index. Criteria regarding
law restriction included restrictions on prepayment penalties and balloon payments. The
Full Index was the sum of the Coverage Index and the Restriction Index. Columns (2)-(4) in
Table 1.A report the HP Index. The index covered only 25 states. In terms of the Full Index,
Illinois, Colorado, and Georgia were the strictest APL law states. And Nevada, Maine, and
Florida were the weakest APL law states. The Coverage Index and the Restriction Index
were weakly correlated. The correlation between the two indices was 0.35 (Table 1.C). For
example, Colorado was one of the strict APL law states in terms of the Coverage Index but
it was not strict in terms of the Restriction Index. This means that the Colorado APL law
covered broader types of mortgage loans but the restrictions on the covered loans were weak.
In the third index, Bostic et al. (2008) extended the HP Index by introducing an addi-
tional index for law enforcement. Hereafter, that index will be denoted as the BEA Index.
The three subindices of the BEA Index were the Coverage Index, the Restriction Index, and
the Enforcement Index. The Coverage Index and the Restriction Index were analogous to
Index and the LE Index are highly correlated (the correlation is 0.9). Knowing that Li and Ernst were
affiliated with the CRL and the CRL provides information to the CFED, the close relationship between two
indices is not surprising.
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the corresponding indices in the HP Index. The Enforcement Index measured the scope of
liability and the strength of available legal actions when violations occurred in loan origina-
tion. The Enforcement Index was defined as the sum of the ratings in two criteria regarding
law enforcement (i.e. assignee liability). The Enforcement Index increases with larger re-
sponsibility and stronger penalties on violations. For example, if assignees of mortgages were
liable even after the exercise of due diligence, the Enforcement Index would be high. The
BEA index covered all the states. The Full Index is defined as the sum of the three indices.
Columns (5)-(8) in Table 1.A report the BEA Index. According to the Full Index, New
Mexico, West Virginia, and Massachusetts are the states with the strictest APL laws.
In Panel C of Table 1, the correlation matrix of the indices is reported. In summary,
the correlation matrix shows some level of consistency among the indices, but also shows
significant differences among them. First, all indices are positively correlated. The law
variation roughly coincides within the indices. Second, the correlations within the indices
based on components of the law that are similar tend to be higher than the correlations across
the indices based on components of the law that are different. For example, the Coverage
Index of the HP Index is more correlated with the Coverage Index of the BEA Index than
with any other indices. The Restriction Index of the HP Index shows the highest correlation
with the Restriction Index of the BEA Index. Third, the indices based on components of the
law that are similar are not highly correlated, considering that the indices are intended to
capture similar law variations. The correlation between the Coverage Indices is 0.57 and the
correlation between the Restriction Indices is 0.63. This shows significant differences across
law indices. Last, the CFED Index and the Enforcement Index of the BEA Index are more
correlated with the Restriction Indices than the Coverage Indices.
There are several reasons for the differences. First, the major difference emanates from
the selection of index criteria for measuring law strictness. Note that all of the indices
have been constructed by the weighted sum of the score from the criteria. It is relatively
straightforward to rank the laws by a single criterion since the state APL laws have followed
11
HOEPA’s structure. For example, Utah has maintained the points and fees trigger as in
HOEPA (8% of total loan amount), but North Carolina has lowered the trigger to 5% for loans
under $20,000. Therefore North Carolina has stricter regulations than Utah in terms of the
points and fees trigger. In cases of the restriction on prepayment penalties, Pennsylvania has
maintained the five-year periods of prepayment penalties as in HOEPA, but Massachusetts
has banned all prepayment penalties for high-cost loans. Therefore Massachusetts has stricter
regulation than Pennsylvania on prepayment penalties. However, the selection of criteria has
been an issue and has generated the divergence found in the law indices. The CFED index
evaluated eight features of the law, which were selected by the experts at CRL. The criteria
were chosen by authors for the HP Index and the BEA Index. The Coverage Indices and the
Restriction Indices included four criteria and the Enforcement Index included two criteria.
Another reason for the differences in the law indices stems from the inclusion of non-
HOEPA-type regulations. Following HOEPA, many states introduced “comprehensive” APL
laws to curb predatory lending. “Comprehensive APL laws” refer to complete laws, uniquely
designed to curb predatory lending in the home mortgage market. In column (9) of Table
1.A, effective dates of the state APL laws are reported.19 An effective date exists only if the
state adopted a comprehensive anti-predatory lending law.20 However, there are some states
that have selective regulations on the recurrent practices of the predatory lending, even
though no comprehensive APL law has been enacted. These selective regulations existed
in other consumer credit laws. For example, Iowa has restrictions on prepayment penalties
in home mortgage loans, but has not enacted any comprehensive APL law.21 These non-
HOEPA-type regulations are incorporated in the CFED Index but not in the HP Index or
the BEA Index.22
19The source of data include the Standard & Poor’s Predatory Lending Categories and summary reports
from Butera & Andrews, a law firm.
20Having an effective date does not directly mean that the state law is strict. Some states have enacted
the state laws but the laws have been only a copycat statutes of HOEPA. Those include Florida, Kentucky,
Maine, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Utah (Ding, Quercia, and White (2009)).
21Details can be found in the chapter 535.9 of the Iowa law.
22Bostic et al. (2008) also constructs additional indices on the non-HOEPA-type regulations. The indices
show low correlations with the indices in table 1. Details are omitted for brevity.
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Unfortunately, the law indices are not perfect and are not free from some limitations
in measuring state anti-predatory lending laws. First, all of the law indices are static and
evaluate state anti-predatory lending laws as they existed at a certain point in time. The
CFED Index evaluates APL laws as they existed in 2007 while the HP Index and the BEA
Index evaluates the laws as they existed in 2005. The effective dates of the state laws are
reported in column (9) of Table 1. Note that states adopted anti-predatory lending laws dur-
ing the sample period of 1998-2007. Second, there are some states that did not exclude home
purchase loans from their own state laws, but none of the law indices make that distinction.
On the surface, these laws also applied to home purchase loans, but it is ambiguous as to
whether the states consciously included home purchase loans in their APL laws, especially
when the state’s tendency toward replicating federal regulations is considered.
The Anti-Predatory Lending Law Index for Analysis
For the state APL law index in following analysis, I mainly use the CFED Index to show the
aggregate effect of the law. The CFED Index has several advantages over other indices for
measuring aggregate law effect. First, in terms of closeness to the first principal component
of the law indices, the CFED Index is a representative law index. The principal component
analysis (PCA) is used to identify the core variation among different law indices in Table 1.
The first principal component explains 51% of the variations within the indices. Further, the
first principal component is most highly correlated with the CFED index, with a correlation
of 0.87. Second, the CFED index is a single dimensional index. Multi-dimensional measures,
such as the BEA Index and the HP Index, are useful to understand partial law effects. But
without a reasonable weighting method, it is difficult to judge the aggregate law effect, es-
pecially when partial effects conflict with each other. Lacking a generally accepted method
for aggregating multi-dimensional measures, Bostic et al. (2008) proposed an additive index,
which is the Full Index. However, the Full Index assumes that partial effects from the Cov-
erage Index and the Restriction Index have equal weights on aggregate law effect. Third, the
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CFED Index includes non-HOEPA-type regulations. By ignoring non-HOEPA regulations,
other indices may underestimate the law strictness in some states. Last, the CFED Index
exists for all the states while the HP Index is only available for the half of the states.
To avoid the issue of law persistence, which encompasses anticipatory compliance with
forthcoming laws and lagtime in compliance after enactment, and the issue of pre-existing
non-HOEPA law, a static cross-section of the CFED Index has been applied in the analysis.
However, I develop a time-varying CFED Index by interacting the CFED Index with the
effective dates of state APL laws and apply the index to check the robustness of the results.
Regarding the issue of the laws’ applicability to home purchases loans, I presume that anti-
predatory lending laws were applied only to mortgage refinancing and not to home purchases.
However, even if APL laws applied to home purchases in some states, the difference between
the two markets will show the lower bound of laws’ effect. That is, ideally, the home purchases
market would not be covered by APL laws and would provide a hypothetical control group.
However, the control group is contaminated and the laws may affect some part of the home
purchase market. Still the difference between the two markets will provide the lower bound
of the laws’ effect, in a worst case scenario.
The metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as of Dec 200923 is used as a main regional
unit of interest. Considering the local characteristics of the housing market, MSA-level
analysis is more appropriate than state-level analysis. For applying state-level law indices to
MSA-level analysis, state-level law indices are mapped into a MSA-level variable. For those
MSAs within a state, the state law index has been assigned. For those MSAs across several
different states, a population-weighted state index has been assigned. There are 44 MSAs
across multiple states.24 For example, in the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI MSA for
the years 1998-2007, on average, 91% of the population lived in Illinois, 7% lived in Indiana,
23See http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/bulletins/b10-02.pdf.
2444 MSAs include the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH MSA, the Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC
MSA, the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI MSA, the Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI MSA,
the New York Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA MSA, the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington,
PA-NJ-DE-MD MSA, and the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA.
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and 2% lived in Wisconsin. As a result, the law index assigned to Chicago-Naperville-Joliet,
IL-IN-WI MSA is closest to the law index of Illinois. Figure 1 reports the MSA-level CFED
Index on the map of the United States.
3. Data
I have collected data from several sources for the analysis including: 1) loan-level residential
mortgage origination data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA); 2) MSA-level
consumer expenditure data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) prepared by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); 3) MSA-level house price index (HPI) from the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA); 4) MSA-level mortgage rates from the Monthly Interest
Rate Survey (MIRS) by the FHFA; 5) MSA-level elasticity of housing supply data from
Saiz (2010); 6) MSA-level unemployment rates from the BLS and; 7) MSA-level income and
population data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Loan Origination: The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
Enacted by Congress in 1975, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, or HMDA, requires most
mortgage originators located in metropolitan areas to report basic attributes of mortgage
applications. HMDA covers a broad set of financial institutions, both depository and non-
depository. Inclusion of an institution depends on the size of its origination and the weight
of residential mortgage lending in its portfolio.25
Because HMDA covers a wide number of loans across the country, using HMDA offers
great advantage in analyzing loan origination process. HMDA is known as the most com-
prehensive source of mortgage origination data, and covers almost 80% of all home loans
nationwide (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007b)). Table 2 reports the scope of the HMDA
25Any depository institution with an office in an MSA must report to HMDA if it has originated any home
purchase loans or has refinanced any home purchase loans and if it has assets above an annually adjusted
threshold ($39 million for 2010). Any non-depository institution with at least 10% of its portfolio in home
purchase loans must report to HMDA if its assets exceed $ 10 million. As a result, small lenders and lenders
without any office in a MSA are not reported in the HMDA data (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laevan (2009)).
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data by comparing it with the mortgage origination estimate from the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA).26 From 1998 to 2007, on average, the HMDA data covers 84% of total
originations, 94% of total originations in the refinance market, and 76% of total originations
in the home purchase market.
HMDA data includes loan characteristics such as loan type (conventional or government-
backed), loan purpose (home purchase, home improvement, and refinancing), types of prop-
erty (single-family and multifamily), loan amounts, and location (state, county, and Census
tract). HMDA data also includes borrower characteristics such as income, race, and gender.
In addition, HMDA data provides the status of applications, that is, whether a loan was
originated or denied.
I use HMDA data from 1998 to 2007. This includes the period of the recent housing
market boom, which is the year of interest for this study. To analyze the impact of state APL
laws on mortgage loan origination, I focus on conventional single-family loans.27 Following
the suggestion by Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007a), I categorize home improvement loans
as refinancing. Using the five-digit Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code,
I aggregate loan-level data into MSA-level data using the MSA definition as of December
2009. In total, 363 MSAs are defined.
In Table 3, I present the summary statistics of variables. Panel A in Table 3 summarizes
the variables from HMDA data. The number of applications (APPL), the amount of orig-
ination (AMTO), and denial rates (DR) are reported by loan purpose: home purchase or
refinance. First, refinance loans show a greater average number of applications and a greater
average amount of originations than applications and originations for home purchase loans.
The average AMTO is $2.93 billion for refinance loans but $2 billion for home purchase
loans. The average APPL in refinance loans is twice as large as in home purchase loans.
Second, the standard deviations of APPL and AMTO are also larger in refinance loans than
26See http://www.mbaa.org/ResearchandForecasts/ForecastsandCommentary.
27Government-backed loans are regarded as safer mortgages and less likely to be affected by abusive
mortgage practice. Normally, multi-family loans are not covered under the APL laws.
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in home purchase loans, implying larger variations of APPL and AMTO across MSAs in
mortgage refinancing. Last, refinance loans show a higher average denial rate (42.74%) than
home purchase loans (28.84%).
Expenditure: The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES)
To measure household economic activity, the expenditure data from the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey (CES) is used. The survey data is collected for the Bureau of Labor Statistics by
the U.S. Census Bureau to provide information on the buying habits of American consumers,
including data on their expenditures, income, and consumer unit (families and single con-
sumers) characteristics. The data provides households’ expenditures in detailed categories:
food, housing, transportation and alcoholic beverages.
Due to confidentiality issues, specific geographic information of sample households is
missing in public microdata. However, BLS additionally reports MSA-level expenditures for
some major MSAs.28 The number of available MSAs changes from period to period: 28
MSAs from 1998 to 2004, 24 MSAs in 2005, and 18 MSAs from 2006 onward. In spite of
the small number of samples, those MSAs encompass wide coverage and include most of
the representative MSAs in the country: Atlanta , Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland,
Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis-St.Paul, New York,
Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Diego , San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.
Panel C in Table 3 summarizes average consumer expenditures for 1998 to 2007. Total
annual expenditures are on the first row and detailed breakdowns by expenditure purpose
follows. The mean of annual consumer expenditures was $47,176. Among MSAs with a full
sample, the highest average expenditure during the sample period ($59,267) was reported in
San Francisco, CA, and the lowest average expenditure ($40,727) was in Cleveland, OH. On
average, expenditures for housing (35%), transportation (18%), and food (13%) add up to
two-thirds of total expenditures.
28See http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxmsa.htm
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Local Housing Market and Demographics
To control for the condition of local housing markets, three variables are considered. First is
the house price index (HPI) from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).29 The HPI
Index is available for all 363 MSAs. Second, the regional mortgage rates are from the Monthly
Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) by the FHFA.30 The survey provides annual information on
interest rates, loan terms, and house prices by state. Data for all of 51 states is available.
Lastly, the elasticities of housing supply are from Saiz (2010). Using satellite-generated
geographic data, he measured the supply elasticity of housing as a function of both the
amount of developable land and the regulatory constraints.31 However, the supply elasticities
are defined by the MSA definition as of 1999 and a significant change in the MSA definition
occurred in 2000. I link up 1999 MSAs with current MSAs by hand-matching counties in
MSAs. In total, I find 280 MSAs according to the current definition where the housing
supply elasticity is applicable.
In addition to the controls for the regional housing market, local demographics are con-
sidered. MSA-level unemployment rates are taken from the BLS data. Average personal
income and population of MSAs are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Demographic variables are available for all 363 MSAs.
Panel B in Table 3 summarizes the variables of local housing market conditions and local
demographics, from 1998 to 2007. The effective interest rates on mortgage (EFFINT) are
29In 1975, the HPI was developed by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or OHFEO
as a regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In 2008, OHFEO became a part of FHFA. The HPI was
called the OHFEO HPI, but now is called as the FHFA HPI. The FHFA HPI is a weighted, repeat-sales
index of single-family house price. It means that the HPI measures average price changes in repeat sales or
refinancings on the same properties in 363 MSAs. Information is obtained by the mortgage transactions that
have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Since the HPI Index only includes houses
with mortgages within the conforming amount limits, the index has a natural cap and does not account for
jumbo mortgages.
30The survey was conducted by asking a sample of mortgage lenders to report the terms and conditions
on all single-family, purchase-money, non-farm loans. The survey excludes FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed
loans, multifamily loans, mobile home loans, and loans created by refinancing another mortgage. Although
the data only incorporates home purchase loans, it is still useful to control for the level differences between
the regional mortgage rates.
31Data is available from Saiz’s website. http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/∼saiz/.
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a variable by state. Annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), housing supply elasticity
(Elasticity), unemployment rates (UNEMP), per capita income (INC), and the log number
of populations (logPOP) are the variables by MSA. For the housing supply elasticity, the
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA MSA shows the lowest elasticity with 0.63 and the
Pine Bluff, AR MSA shows the highest elasticity with 12.15.
4. The Effect on Home Mortgage Origination
Home mortgage origination has been largely affected by housing prices, mortgage interest
rates, and housing supply elasticity. Here, the effects of these variables on home mortgage
origination have been examined by loan purpose, using the U.S. aggregate data.
First is the effect of mortgage interest rates on the amount of origination (AMTO) and
on the denial rate (DR). When mortgage rates are low, households can refinance existing
mortgages with either lower periodic payments, or larger cash-out amounts, or both. And
households can borrow with lower interest cost when they purchase a home. Considering
that mortgage originators have supported increased demand during the recent housing boom
period (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laevan (2009)), the decline in mortgage rates will increase
the AMTO and decrease the DR, in both refinance loans and home purchase loans. Figure 2
reports the AMTO and the DR with the 30-year mortgage rate.32 The HMDA data is used
to report the U.S. aggregate AMTO and the U.S. average DR, by loan purpose. In panel A
of figure 2, the AMTOs in mortgage refinancing and in home purchases are compared with
the 30-year mortgage rate. AMTOs are negatively related to the mortgage rate, both in
mortgage refinancing and in home purchases, but the negative correlation is more evident in
refinancing loans. The AMTO in mortgage refinancing rapidly increases from 2000 to 2003
and this period coincides with the large decline of mortgage rates. After 2004, mortgage
rates stopped declining and the AMTO in mortgage refinancing dropped considerably. In
32The conventional, conforming 30-year fixed-rate from Primary Mortgage Market Survey by Freddie Mac
is used (http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms archives.html).
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panel B, the DR in mortgage refinancing and in home purchases are compared with the 30-
year mortgage rate. DRs are positively correlated with the mortgage rate. In both markets,
a large drop in the DR appeared with the large decline of mortgage rates from 2000 to 2003.
Second is the effect of housing price on the AMTO and on the DR. When home prices
increase, households can refinance their home loans to cash-out the increased home equity.
Although the role of home price appreciation on the demand for home purchase loans is
not obvious, the demand will increase if households expect a momentum in home prices.
Mortgage originators are more willing to originate home mortgage when the collateral value
rises. Figure 3 reports the AMTO and the DR with the U.S. national Home Price Index
(HPI) from FHFA. As before, the HMDA data is used for the U.S. aggregate AMTO and
the U.S. average DR, by loan purpose. The HPI is compared with AMTOs in panel A and
with DRs in panel B, by loan purpose. While AMTOs show positive correlation with the
HPI, DR is negatively related to the HPI.
Third is the role of elasticity of housing supply. Historically, inelastic MSAs have expe-
rienced precipitous increases of HPI. Given the supply constraint, when there is a demand
shock, price has reacted more sensitively in inelastic MSAs. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz
(2008) show that the price run-ups of the 1980s were almost exclusively experienced in cities
where the housing supply is more inelastic. Figure 4 reports the time-series of the HPI by
housing supply elasticity. MSAs are divided into two groups: elastic MSAs and inelastic
MSAs. Average HPIs of the groups are plotted. The plot shows that HPI appreciation has
been isolated to inelastic MSAs during the recent housing boom. Larger mortgage demands
in inelastic MSAs are expected since the expected benefit from home price appreciation is
high. Figure 5 reports the time series of the AMTO and the DR, by elasticity. The time-
series of the AMTO and the DR are reported, in panel A and panel B respectively, by loan
purpose and by supply elasticity. Panel A shows that the growth in the AMTO has been
concentrated in inelastic MSAs, both in the refinance market and in the home purchase
market. Panel B shows that the DR in refinancing tends to be low in inelastic MSAs.
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In summary, home price appreciation and the decline of mortgage rates tends to promote
home-based borrowing, by increasing the amount of originations and by decreasing the de-
nial rate. Growth in the amount of origination has been concentrated in inelastic areas.
The Impact of Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on Mortgage Refinancing
I test the hypothesis that anti-predatory lending laws inhibited the volume of refinancing
mortgage during the housing-bubble period. I use cross-state variation in the strictness
of state anti-predatory lending laws and their application to only mortgage refinancing as
opposed to home purchases to develop a difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of
these laws on mortgage volume. Since the laws applied only to mortgage refinancing and
not to home purchases, but the predatory lending occurred in both markets, the comparison
between the two markets will identify the laws’ effect by using the home purchase market as
a control group. Following regression is applied to refinance loans and home purchase loans
separately.
Yit = α + αt + β · APLi + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where, the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year. The years covered by
the regression are from 1998 to 2007. The denial rate (DR), the log amount of origination
(logAMTO), and the log number of applications (logAPPL), are left-hand side variables. The
CFED Index is used for the APL law variations. Control variables include annual home price
appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rate (EFFINT), supply elasticity (Elasticity),
income per capita (INC), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and the log numbers of population
(logPOP). Year dummy variables are included. For the robust level of significance, all
21
standard errors are clustered by state. Testing hypothesis is as follows:
βDR > 0, βAMTO < 0, and βAPPL < 0 in refinance loans
βDR = 0, βAMTO = 0, and βAPPL = 0 in home purchase loans.
Table 4 reports the regression results. Columns (1)-(3) report the results on refinance
loans and columns (4)-(6) report the results on home purchase loans. Strict APL law is
associated with a significant increase in the DR, a significant decrease in the logAMTO, and
a significant decrease in the logAPPL, only in refinance loans. A stark contrast between
mortgage refinancing market and home purchases market controls any endogenous factor
that might simultaneously affect the cross-state variation of the APL law and predatory
mortgage lending. If the predatory mortgage volumes are correlated with any state-specific
variable, then the law effect should appear in home purchase market. For example, both
the cross-state law variation and predatory mortgage volume could be affected by liberal
versus conservative sentiments in the states, but the difference between refinancing and
home purchases rejects that argument.
On average, a unit increase in the APL law Index raises the denial rate by 0.43%, decreases
the amount of origination by 2.85%, and decreases the number of applications by 1.69% while
all other variables are held constant. Considering that the APL law index ranges from 0 to
12, the results show significant reduction in refinancing volume in states with the strictest
laws. The economic significance of the APL variable is also large. The economic significance
is calculated and reported under the APL variable in Table 4. For example, a one-standard
deviation increase in the APL law index is associated with a 0.15-standard deviation increase
in the DR. (A one-standard deviation increase in APL is associated with a 3.52 [1 SD] x
0.00428 [slope] = 0.015 increase in DR, which is 0.015 / 0.1 = 0.15-standard deviation of
DR.)
Among control variables, HPIAPP, EFFINT, and Elasticity show similar results both in
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refinance loans and in home purchase loans. Note that the variables reflect local housing
market conditions. With favorable market signals, the DR declines, the logAMTO increases,
and the logAPPL increases. Favorable market signals include high HPIAPP, low EFFINT,
and low Elasticity. For other control variables, higher INC is associated with a decline in
the DR, an increase in the logAMTO, and an increase in the logAPPL. High UNEMP does
the opposite. logPOP is positively associated with the logAMTO and the logAPPL.
Whether the reduction in mortgage volume comes solely from inhibited predatory loans
remains as an empirical question. In principle, the anti-predatory lending laws can also
inhibit legitimate high-cost loans. Previous studies on the law effect showed that the reduc-
tion in subprime mortgage volume mostly came from high-cost loans with predatory terms
(Elliehausen, Staten, and Steinbuks (2006); Li and Ernst (2007)).
I find that the reduction in mortgage refinancing volume becomes larger as the Loan-to-
Income ratio (LTI) increases. Table 5 reports the regression results by LTI. Regressions are
same as in Table 4 except that a dependent variable, logAMTO, is disaggregated by LTI.
Columns (1)-(4) report the results on mortgage refinancing and columns (5)-(8) report the
results on home purchases. As in Table 4, strict APL laws are associated with a significant
decrease in the logAMTO only in refinance loans. The magnitude of reduction is larger in
high LTI groups. On average, a unit increase in the APL law index decreases the amount
of originations by 4.51% in the highest LTI group but by 1.79% in the lowest LTI group.
Similar results appear in DR (not reported). The denial rate in mortgage refinancing volume
also increases with larger LTI. A unit increase in the APL law index raises the denial rate
by 0.58% in the highest LTI group but by 0.34% in the lowest LTI group. Considering that
LTI is one of the frequently used proxy measures for the riskiness of loans, this result shows
that the laws have been more influential on the loans with higher risk characteristics.
Robustness
To avoid the issue of law persistence, which encompasses anticipatory compliance with forth-
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coming laws and lagtime in compliance after enactment, and the issue of pre-existing non-
HOEPA law, a static cross-section of the CFED Index has been applied in the analysis. For
the robustness of the results regarding the time-varying law index, I develop a time-varying
CFED Index by interacting the CFED Index with the effective dates of state APL laws.
Table 6 reports the regression results. The main results in Table 4 are unchanged.
For the robustness of the results regarding the choice of sample period, I run the same
regressions with different sample periods. Regression results are robust by any choice of
sample year. For brevity, the regression results with different sample years are not reported.
5. The Effect on Household Expenditure
During the recent housing boom period, favorable market conditions for household credit
coexisted in the home mortgage market: low mortgage rates, high home price apprecia-
tion, and evolutions in the mortgage market such as securitization. U.S. household leverage
increased sharply during the period and a significant share of the rise came from the bor-
rowings against increased home equity by existing homeowners. (Greenspan and Kennedy
(2007); Khandani, Lo, and Merton (2010)). However, Mian and Sufi (2011) found that
money extracted through refinancing was not used for other investments or the repayment
of existing debts, postulating that the money must have been used for “real outlays” such
as consumption or home improvements.
Using the finding that anti-predatory lending laws inhibited the volume of mortgage
lending only in refinancing, I test whether household expenditures have been affected by
mortgage refinancing availability in the recent housing boom. Starting with a reduced form
model for the APL laws’ effect on household expenditures, I instrument the amount of orig-
ination in refinancing by the APL law to conduct IV analysis, for testing the effect of the
APL laws on household expenditures through volume of mortgage refinancing. Considering
the pivotal role of refinancing to the housing wealth effect on household consumption (Muell-
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bauer (2008); Cooper (2009); Peek (2010)), significant reductions in household expenditures
is expected in states with strict APL laws.
Following regression is applied to the household expenditures by purpose.
Yit = α + αt + β · APLi + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year. The years covered by the
regression are 1998 to 2007. Left-hand side variables are the annual average expenditures of
the consumer unit. MSA-level household expenditure data is from the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey (CES). The CFED index is used for the APL law variation. Control variables
include annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rate (EFFINT),
supply elasticity (Elasticity), income per capita (INC), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and
the log numbers of population (logPOP). Year dummy variables are included. All standard
errors are clustered by state.
Table 7 reports the regression results. Panel A reports the regression results on total
expenditures and panel B reports the results on the expenditures by purpose. Panel C reports
the results by subdividing the expenditure purposes in panel B. For brevity, demographic
control variables are not reported. Panel A shows that strict APL law is significantly related
to the reduction in total expenditures. On average, a unit increase in the APL law index
reduces the total expenditure by $754 while all other variables are held constant. The
economic significance is also large. A one-standard deviation increase in the APL law index
is associated with a 0.28-standard deviation decline in total expenditures. (A one-standard
deviation increase in the APL law index is associated with a 2.73 [1 SD] x 754 [slope x
-1] = 2058.42 decrease in total expenditures, which is 2058.42 / 7475.56 = 0.28-standard
deviation of DR.) Among control variables, EFFINT is negatively associated with household
expenditures. Elasticity, INC, and logPOP are positively associated with expenditures.
Annual home price appreciation does not show any significance.
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Panel B reports the significant reduction in various expenditure purposes. Statistical
significance appears for the expenditure purposes, including Food, Housing, Apparel and
Services, Transportation, Personal Care Products and Services, and Personal Insurance and
Pensions. On average, a unit increase in the APL law Index reduces the expenditure on
Housing by $273.1, Transportation by $173, Personal Insurance and Pensions by $92.75, and
Food by $64.08, while all other variables are held constant. Considering that the expendi-
tures for Food accounts for the third largest portion of total expenditures, reduction in the
Food expenditure is relatively small compared to the other expenditure purposes. Economic
significances are also large in most of the expenditure purposes.
Panel C reports the regression results by subdividing the expenditure purposes in panel B.
In the Food category, a significant reduction appears in the expenditures for Food Away From
Home but not for Food At Home. Households cut expenses for eating out without cutting
the expenditure for home cooking. Note that the expenditures for Fruits and Vegetables
show significant reduction among the subcategories of Food At Home. In the category of
Housing, significant reductions are found in most of the expenditure purposes. The largest
expenditure reduction comes from Shelter, which includes Owned Dwellings and Rented
Dwellings.33 In the Transportation category, the expenditures on Gasoline and Motor Oil
and Other Vehicle Expenses show significant decline. Among the control variables, EFFINT
is negatively related to various expenditure purposes, including Owned Dwellings. Since
the definition of Owned Dwellings includes not only the costs of interest payments but
also the other expenses for owned dwellings, the EFFINT is negatively associated with the
expenditure on it.
Instead of the reduced form model in Table 7, I instrument the amount of origination
(AMTO) in refinancing with the APL law index to test whether household expenditures
increase with refinancing funding availability. The CFED index is used for the APL law
33The definition of Owned Dwellings includes expenses for repairs and maintenance (including DIY),
interest on mortgages, refinancing/payment charges, and property insurance. The definition of Rented
Dwellings includes rent paid for dwellings, parking fees, maintenance, and other expenses.
26
variation. Details of regression specification are same as in Table 7.
Yit = α + αt + β · AMTOIVit + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year.
Table 8 reports results. Panel A reports the regression results on total expenditures and
panel B reports the results on the expenditures by purpose. F-statistics in the first stage
regression are significant with any level of significance (p-value=0.0000). In panel A, the
instrumented AMTO increases total expenditure. In panel B, the increase in household
expenditures remains for various purposes. The results indicate that a significant portion of
household expenditures have been increased by extended mortgage refinancing availability
in states with weak APL laws. By controlling the amount of origination in refinance through
the APL law variation, I find that household expenditures increase with a larger amount of
origination in refinancing in the states with weak APL laws. Since the APL laws discipline
the mortgage refinancing market by restricting excessive lending, the extra expenditures
must have been unsustainable without the influx of home equity dollars.
6. Discussion
Considering that most of the predatory loans occurred in the subprime market, analyzing
the subprime market alone would show stronger results. However, an effective distinction
between subprime loans and prime loans is unattainable in the analysis due to data issues.
First, HMDA does not identify whether a loan application is for subprime or prime. Second,
common methods for identifying subprime loans in HMDA are not suitable for this study.
To separate subprime loans from prime loans, two different methods have been commonly
used by researchers: 1) the rate spread data in HMDA, or 2) the Subprime and Manufactured
Home Lenders list by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).34 Since
34http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/manu.html.
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the HUD list is only available up to 2005 and the rate spread in HMDA is available from
2004, inconsistency in defining subprime lending is inevitable. Considering that the two
methods have own inherent biases35 in measuring subprime volumes and that 2004-2005
were the years of extra importance, the change of definition in 2004-2005 makes it hard to
separate the subprime market results. When using the HUD list for identifying subprime
loans in HMDA, Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007) estimate that 26% of loans by prime
lenders were in the category of subprime loans.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I test the impact of anti-predatory lending laws, examining 1) whether the laws
inhibited mortgage volume, especially in mortgage refinancing, during the housing-bubble
period and 2) whether restricted mortgage refinancing as a result of these laws reduced
household consumption. The impact of anti-predatory lending laws is a little-studied but
important question, since the laws are closely connected to the main characteristic features
of the recent housing crisis.
Predatory lending practices in the home mortgage market have grown with mortgage
35In 2004, HMDA started to report the rate spread to the comparable-maturity Treasury for first-lien
mortgages with an APR 3% points over the Treasury benchmark and for junior liens with an APR 5%
percentage points over the benchmark. Researchers interpreted the loans with the rate spread information
as a proxy for subprime loans. However, biases exist in this definition. Bias can be seen in the following:
First, high interest rates do not occur solely in subprime loans. When the spread of mortgage rates increases
relative to the Treasuries, 3% points over Treasury benchmark might classify some part of prime loans as
subprime loans. Second, in cases of adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), subprime loans might be under-
represented. Using comparable-maturity Treasuries, an ARM with a contract maturity of 30 years will be
compared with long-term Treasury security, which normally has higher than short-term interest rates. But
ARMs’ interest is based on short-term interest. So ARM loans are less likely to be identified as subprime
loans than fixed rate mortgage (FRM) loans. Third, there is no consideration for regional differences in the
interest rate for classifying subprime loans. As a result, a loan originated in the region with a high average
interest rate is more likely defined as a subprime loan than the same loan originated in a region with low
interest rates. Finally, the rate spread is reported only if a loan is originated, so we cannot compute a denial
rate for subprime loans.
In the HMDA data before 2004, researchers defined subprime loans using the HUD list of subprime lenders.
HUD made a list of subprime lenders by identifying lenders that specialize in subprime lending (See Mayer
and Pence (2008) for more detailed explanation). But defining subprime loans by the HUD list also generates
bias. Subprime lenders may also originate prime loans, and non-subprime lenders can originate subprime
loans. Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007) suggested that the latter case is a larger source of bias and
subprime loans would be understated by this method.
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credit expansion. To cope with increasing evidence of predatory lending practices, Congress
enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 1994. Since HOEPA
was deemed insufficient to curb abusive practices, many states enacted laws limiting preda-
tory mortgage lending to fill HOEPA’s gaps. State anti-predatory lending laws followed
HOEPA’s structure but employed varying levels of strictness based on their own interests.
As a result, state laws varied in the strictness of their provisions.
I use cross-state variation in the strictness of anti-predatory lending (APL) laws and
their application only to mortgage refinancing as opposed to home purchases to develop a
difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of these laws on mortgage volume. Consistent
with my hypothesis, I find that states with stricter laws had lower mortgage refinancing vol-
ume but exhibited no difference in home purchase mortgage volume. I find that the reduction
in mortgage refinancing volume becomes larger as the Loan-to-Income ratio increases.
I also test whether by restricting mortgage refinancing, these laws impacted household
expenditures. I use the result that the laws inhibited the mortgage refinancing volume to
estimate a reduced form model for the APL laws’ effect on household expenditures. I find
that strict APL laws are significantly associated with the reduction in total expenditures.
Next, I instrument the amount of origination (AMTO) in mortgage refinancing with the
APL law index to conduct IV analysis. I find that the instrumented AMTO increases total
household expenditures. This indicates that a significant portion of household expenditures
have been increased by extended mortgage refinancing availability in states with weak APL
laws.
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Table 1: Indices for the State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
Table 1 reports the indices on the state anti-predatory lending laws. Panel A reports the indices by state. Column (1) shows the
index from the Corporation for Enterprise Development (2007). Columns (2)-(4) show the index from Ho and Pennington-Cross
(2006). The HP Index measures the law by two separate dimensions: Coverage and Restriction. Full Index is the sum of the
Coverage Index and the Restriction Index. Columns (5)-(8) show the index from Bostic et al. (2008). The BEA Index extends the
HP Index by introducing the Enforcement Index in addition to the Coverage Index and the Restriction Index. Full Index is the
sum of the three indices. In column (9), effective dates of the state anti-predatory lending laws are reported. Effective dates exist
only for states with comprehensive anti-predatory lending laws. Panel B reports summary statistics of the law indices. Panel C
reports the correlation matrix between the indices.
Panel A : Indices by State
CFED HP BEA Effective
Full Coverage Restriction Full Coverage Restriction Enforcement Date
State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
New Mexico 12 12.91 6.28 6.63 9.9 4.17 3.27 2.46 1/1/04
North Carolina 12 5.07 1.11 3.96 6.4 1.72 3.27 1.41 7/1/00
Massachusetts 10 9.68 4.13 5.55 8.43 2.15 3.82 2.46 11/7/04
Rhode Island 10 0 0 0 0 12/31/06
West Virginia 10 9 5.6 1.64 1.76 6/5/02
New Jersey 9 6.27 3.13 3.14 7.34 2.15 2.73 2.46 11/27/03
South Carolina 9 8.83 2.36 6.47 4.8 0.86 2.18 1.76 1/1/04
New York 8 6.82 4.13 2.69 5.82 2.15 1.91 1.76 4/1/03
Georgia 7 14.89 4.13 10.76 6.83 1.72 3 2.11 3/7/03
Illinois 6 17.16 8.73 8.43 8.11 3.74 1.91 2.46 1/1/04
Arkansas 5 10.06 2.73 7.33 6.56 1.72 2.73 2.11 7/16/03
DC 5 14.89 10.5 4.39 7.76 3.74 1.91 2.11 5/7/02
Indiana 5 7.55 2.36 5.19 6.75 1.29 3 2.46 1/1/05
Minnesota 4 7.01 6.46 0.55 0 1/1/03
Tennessee 4 0 0 0 0 1/1/07
Texas 4 3.8 0.74 3.06 4.33 0.86 1.36 2.11 9/1/01
Vermont 3 0 0 0 0
Alaska 2 0 0 0 0
Connecticut 2 6.93 2.73 4.2 4.88 0.86 1.91 2.11 10/1/01
Florida 2 1.98 0 1.98 3.75 0 1.64 2.11 10/2/02
Iowa 2 0 0 0 0
Maine 2 1.47 1.47 0 3.01 0 0.55 2.46
Maryland 2 10.51 5.84 4.67 3.4 1.44 0.55 1.41 10/1/02
Michigan 2 5.99 5.17 0.82 0 12/23/02
Idaho 1 0 0 0 0
Kansas 1 0 0 0 0
Kentucky 1 4.96 0.74 4.22 5.85 0.86 2.18 2.81 6/24/03
Missouri 1 0 0 0 0
Virginia 1 0 0 0 0 6/26/03
Wisconsin 1 2.63 1.55 1.08 0 0 0 0 2/1/05
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0
California 0 7.07 5.09 1.98 4.92 2.15 1.36 1.41 7/1/02
Colorado 0 16.18 12.87 3.31 4.18 0.43 1.64 2.11 6/7/03
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 0
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0
Montana 0 0 0 0 0
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 3/20/03
Nevada 0 1.47 1.47 0 2.81 0 0 2.81 10/1/03
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 1/1/04
North Dakota 0 0 0 0 0
Ohio 0 2.37 1.47 0.9 3.47 0 1.36 2.11 5/24/02
Oklahoma 0 4.59 0.74 3.85 4.29 0 2.18 2.11 1/1/04
Oregon 0 0 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 0 2.91 1.47 1.44 3.47 0 1.36 2.11 6/25/02
South Dakota 0 0 0 0 0
Utah 0 2.55 1.47 1.08 3.9 1.72 2.18 0 5/3/04
Washington 0 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel B : Summary Statistics
CFED HP BEA
Full Coverage Restriction Full Coverage Restriction Enforcement
State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean 2.80 7.34 3.49 3.85 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
S.D. 3.64 4.85 3.23 2.67 3.19 1.62 1.17 1.10
Max 12 17.16 12.87 10.76 9.9 6.46 3.82 2.81
Min 0 1.47 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel C : Correlation Matrix
CFED HP BEA
Full Coverage Restriction Full Coverage Restriction Enforcement
State (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CFED 1.00 0.40 0.13 0.57 0.67 0.55 0.66 0.44
HP
Full 1.00 0.86 0.78 0.64 0.69 0.40 0.21
Coverage 1.00 0.35 0.40 0.57 0.08 0.11
Restriction 1.00 0.69 0.56 0.63 0.25
BEA
Full 1.00 0.79 0.88 0.79
Coverage 1.00 0.49 0.30
Restriction 1.00 0.78
Enforcement 1.00
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Table 2: The Coverage of the HMDA Data
Table 2 compares the HMDA data with the mortgage origination estimate from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) as
a benchmark. The HMDA data includes conventional single-family loans. Benchmark estimates also cover all home mortgages
for single-family loans. Panel A reports the total originations. Panel B reports the amount of originations for home purchase
loans. Panel C reports the amount of originations for refinance purpose loans. In each panel, the HMDA data is compared with
the mortgage origination estimate from the MBA.
Panel A: Total Originations
HMDA Market (Estimate) Coverage
Year (millions of dollars) (percent)
1998 1,292 1,656 78.00
1999 1,078 1,379 78.15
2000 882 1,139 77.40
2001 1,798 2,243 80.17
2002 2,495 2,854 87.43
2003 3,327 3,812 87.28
2004 2,470 2,773 89.08
2005 2,774 3,027 91.64
2006 2,505 2,726 91.90
2007 1,965 2,306 85.23
Average 2,059 2,392 84.63
Panel B: Originations for Home Purchase
HMDA Market (Estimate) Coverage
Year (millions of dollars) (percent)
1998 518 795 65.14
1999 589 878 67.11
2000 616 905 68.05
2001 671 960 69.94
2002 817 1,097 74.45
2003 903 1,280 70.55
2004 1,105 1,309 84.38
2005 1,325 1,512 87.62
2006 1,216 1,399 86.94
2007 922 1,140 80.84
Average 868 1,128 75.50
Panel C: Originations for Refinance
HMDA Market (Estimate) Coverage
Year (millions of dollars) (percent)
1998 774 862 89.78
1999 488 500 97.69
2000 266 234 113.58
2001 1,127 1,283 87.82
2002 1,678 1,757 95.53
2003 2,424 2,532 95.74
2004 1,366 1,463 93.36
2005 1,449 1,514 95.71
2006 1,289 1,326 97.20
2007 1,044 1,166 89.51
Average 1,191 1,264 95.5936
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the variables. The years covered are 1998 to 2007. Panel A summarizes the variables
from the HMDA data. All variables are defined by the MSA. The number of applications (APPL), the amounts of originations
(AMTO), and the denial rate (DR) are reported by loan purpose: home purchase and refinance. Panel B summarizes the
variables on the local housing market conditions and local demographics. Effective interest rates on mortgages (EFFINT) is
a variable by state. Annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), housing supply elasticity (Elasticity), unemployment rates
(UNEMP), per capita income (INC), and the log number of populations (logPOP) are the variables by MSA. Panel C summarizes
consumer expenditures. Total annual expenditures are on the first row and detailed breakdowns by expenditure purposes
follows.
Panel A: Mortgage Origination
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Source
Refinance Loans
APPL 3630 30582 72748 596 1133482 HMDA
AMTO ($ bils) 3630 2.93 10.2 0.01 203.7 HMDA
DR (%) 3630 41.74 10.01 12.51 71.15 HMDA
Home Purchase Loans
APPL 3630 15830 35891 432 392243 HMDA
AMTO ($ bils) 3630 2.00 5.99 0.01 84.52 HMDA
DR (%) 3630 28.84 11.31 9.65 77.09 HMDA
Panel B: Local Housing Market Conditions and Demographics
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Source
HPIAPP (%) 3627 0.06 0.05 -0.13 0.34 FHFA
EFFINT (%) 510 6.67 0.72 5.42 8.46 FHFA
Elasticity 280 2.52 1.42 0.63 12.15 Saiz (2010)
UNEMP (%) 3630 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.3 BLS
INC ($) 3630 29502 6425 12723 79576 BEA
logPOP 3630 12.61 1.06 10.75 16.75 BEA
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Table 3 (continued)
Panel C: Consumer Expenditure
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Annual Expenditure 246 47,176 7,416 32,928 70,611 BLS
Food 246 5,970 843 3,888 8,393 BLS
Food at home 246 3,369 488 2,298 4,629 BLS
Cereals and bakery products 246 474 66 313 681 BLS
Meats, poultry, fish, and eggs 246 848 131 538 1,182 BLS
Dairy products 246 362 59 234 522 BLS
Fruits and vegetables 246 602 110 384 916 BLS
Other food at home 246 1,083 208 652 1,641 BLS
Food away from home 246 2,601 458 1,589 4,070 BLS
Housing 246 16,308 3,160 9,993 27,310 BLS
Shelter 246 10,058 2,511 4,946 19,519 BLS
Owned dwellings 246 6,637 1,647 3,080 12,526 BLS
Rented dwellings 246 2,812 1,004 1,412 6,432 BLS
Other lodging 246 609 221 222 1,454 BLS
Utilities, fuels, and public services 246 3,004 530 1,977 4,551 BLS
Household operations 246 910 315 383 2,871 BLS
Housekeeping supplies 246 566 101 328 853 BLS
Household furnishings and equipment 246 1,770 394 936 3,090 BLS
Transportation 246 8,326 1,366 5,108 12,596 BLS
Vehicle purchases (net outlay) 246 3,527 909 999 6,383 BLS
Gasoline and motor oil 246 1,574 524 862 3,274 BLS
Other vehicle expenses 246 2,654 400 1,748 3,759 BLS
Public transportation 246 572 237 196 1,479 BLS
Alcoholic beverages 246 479 139 222 928 BLS
Apparel and services 246 1,981 396 954 3,137 BLS
Healthcare 246 2,370 439 1,481 3,705 BLS
Entertainment 246 2,355 558 1,401 4,297 BLS
Personal care products and services 246 595 113 270 932 BLS
Reading 246 155 49 31 312 BLS
Education 246 887 342 285 1,895 BLS
Tobacco products and smoking supplies 246 291 83 95 538 BLS
Miscellaneous 246 885 244 240 2,090 BLS
Cash contributions 246 1,522 541 585 3,687 BLS
Personal insurance and pensions 246 5,053 1,260 3,026 9,408 BLS
Life and other personal insurance 246 413 118 130 1,078 BLS
Pensions and Social Security 246 4,640 1,260 2,632 8,905 BLS
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Table 4: The Impact of the Anti-Predatory Lending Law on Home Mortgage Origination
Table 4 reports the regression results in refinance loans and in home purchase loans. I use cross-state variation in the strictness
of state anti-predatory lending laws and their application to only mortgage refinancing as opposed to home purchases to develop
a difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of these laws on mortgage volume. The years covered in the regression are 1998
to 2007.
Yit = α+ αt + β ·APLi + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year. The log numbers of application (logAPPL), the denial rate
(DR), and the log amounts of origination (logAMTO) are left-hand side variables. The CFED index is used for the APL law
variations. Control variables include annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rate (EFFINT), supply
elasticity (Elasticity), income per capita (INC), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and the log numbers of population (logPOP).
Year dummy variables are included (not reported). Columns (1)-(3) report the results on refinance loans and columns (4)-(6)
report the results on home purchase loans. All standard errors are clustered by state. The table reports point estimates with
robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. Economic significance is also
reported under the APL variable. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in the APL law index is associated with
a 0.15-standard deviation increase in the DR. (A one-standard deviation increase in APL is associated with a 3.52 [1 SD] x
0.00428 [slope] = 0.015 increase in DR, which is 0.015 / 0.1 = 0.15-standard deviation of DR.)
Refinance Home Purchase
DR logAMTO logAPPL DR logAMTO logAPPL
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
APL 0.00428*** -0.0285** -0.0169*** 0.00344 -0.00934 0.000335
(2.915) (-2.247) (-2.752) (1.620) (-0.788) (0.0296)
Economic Significance 0.15 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.00
HPIAPP -0.279*** 2.849*** 0.937*** -0.00501 4.034*** 2.579***
(-3.707) (6.530) (3.517) (-0.0845) (13.31) (8.225)
EFFINT 0.0558* -0.692*** -0.0510 0.0664* -0.425*** 0.0577
(1.951) (-2.728) (-0.241) (1.947) (-2.865) (0.368)
Elasticity 0.00300 -0.111*** -0.0556*** 0.00423 -0.0952*** -0.0250
(0.696) (-3.573) (-2.929) (0.860) (-3.725) (-1.355)
INC -5.50e-06*** 5.53e-05*** 1.42e-05** -3.89e-06** 4.46e-05*** 6.84e-06
(-4.825) (6.326) (2.457) (-2.589) (6.619) (1.541)
UNEMP 1.053*** -2.154 -1.083 0.843** -3.624*** -3.206***
(4.016) (-1.331) (-1.077) (2.511) (-2.902) (-3.819)
logPOP 0.0237*** 0.955*** 0.983*** 0.00636 1.007*** 1.007***
(5.296) (32.14) (42.31) (1.386) (39.72) (52.08)
Constant -0.268 5.106** -2.836* -0.151 2.250** -4.457***
(-1.337) (2.600) (-1.734) (-0.575) (2.367) (-4.204)
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
R-squared 0.631 0.917 0.946 0.371 0.937 0.936
S.E. Clustered by State State State State State State
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: By Loan-to-Income ratio
Table 5 reports the regression results by the Loan-to-Income ratio. Dependent variable is the log amounts of origination (logAMTO) by LTI. The CFED index is used for the
APL law variations. Control variables include annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rate (EFFINT), supply elasticity (Elasticity), income per capita
(INC), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and the log numbers of population (logPOP). Year dummy variables are included (not reported). Columns (1)-(4) report the results on
mortgage refinancing and columns (4)-(6) report the results on home purchases. The years covered in the regression are 1998 to 2007. All standard errors are clustered by state.
The table reports point estimates with robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Refinance Home Purchase
Highest LTI Lowest LTI Highest LTI Lowest LTI
4th Quarter 3rd Quarter 2nd Quarter 1st Quarter 4th Quarter 3rd Quarter 2nd Quarter 1st Quarter
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
APL -0.0451* -0.0308* -0.0153* -0.0179*** -0.0239 -0.0101 0.00320 -0.00407
(-1.760) (-1.996) (-1.945) (-2.786) (-0.987) (-0.849) (0.448) (-0.393)
HPIAPP 4.812*** 2.909*** 1.349*** 0.818** 5.555*** 3.326*** 2.731*** 4.375***
(6.837) (5.953) (3.970) (2.665) (11.20) (10.62) (5.788) (9.977)
EFFINT -0.209*** -0.124*** -0.0571** -0.0463*** -0.179*** -0.0906*** -0.0408 -0.0533
(-3.691) (-3.499) (-2.506) (-3.005) (-4.570) (-3.721) (-1.513) (-1.596)
Elasticity -1.407*** -0.647* -0.0820 -0.0256 -1.126*** -0.250 0.301* 0.0334
(-3.010) (-1.877) (-0.385) (-0.185) (-3.605) (-1.176) (1.766) (0.174)
UNEMP -1.793 -2.944 -3.131** -2.609** -3.548 -4.677*** -3.834*** -2.531**
(-0.601) (-1.549) (-2.619) (-2.196) (-1.380) (-3.185) (-3.027) (-2.151)
logPOP 0.949*** 0.979*** 0.953*** 0.935*** 1.016*** 1.028*** 0.964*** 0.985***
(20.36) (29.22) (36.73) (36.19) (31.32) (44.41) (31.03) (25.98)
INC 7.64e-05*** 5.45e-05*** 3.80e-05*** 3.24e-05*** 6.66e-05*** 4.16e-05*** 2.59e-05*** 2.40e-05***
(5.572) (5.659) (5.353) (4.673) (6.264) (5.244) (3.730) (3.440)
Constant 8.400** 3.303 -0.0769 -1.043 5.560** -0.210 -3.522*** -3.023**
(2.314) (1.269) (-0.0489) (-1.026) (2.389) (-0.148) (-3.429) (-2.585)
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
R-squared 0.830 0.894 0.940 0.957 0.875 0.933 0.937 0.910
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
R-squared 0.830 0.894 0.940 0.957 0.619 0.679 0.663 0.401
S.E. Clustered State State State State State State State State
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
40
Table 6: Robustness Check for the Time-Varying Law Index
Table 6 reports the regression results in refinance loans and in home purchase loans. Instead of using the static law measure as in
table 4, a time-varying law index is used by interacting the law index with the effective date of the state law (APLi ·I{t>=ED}).
The effective date (ED) of the state law is reported in column (9) of Table 1. The years covered in the regression are 1998 to
2007.
Yit = α+ αt + β ·APLi · I{t>=ED} + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year. The log numbers of application (logAPPL), the denial rate
(DR), and the log amounts of origination (logAMTO) are left-hand side variables. The CFED index is used for the APL law
variation. Control variables include annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rate (EFFINT), supply
elasticity (Elasticity), income per capita (INC), unemployment rate (UNEMP), and the log numbers of population (logPOP).
Year dummy variables are included (not reported). Columns (1)-(3) report the results on refinance loans and columns (4)-(6)
report the results on home purchase loans. All standard errors are clustered by state. The table reports point estimates with
robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. Economic significance is also
reported under the APL variable. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in the APL law index is associated with a
0.11-standard deviation increase in the DR.
Refinance Home Purchase
DR logAMTO logAPPL DR logAMTO logAPPL
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
APL 0.00364*** -0.0328** -0.0218*** 0.00195 -0.0108 -0.00317
(3.249) (-2.084) (-3.344) (1.033) (-0.878) (-0.322)
Economic Significance 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.01
HPIAPP -0.283*** 2.820*** 0.902*** -0.0155 4.024*** 2.555***
(-3.733) (6.555) (3.461) (-0.276) (13.48) (8.194)
EFFINT 0.0600** -0.722*** -0.0694 0.0694* -0.435*** 0.0570
(2.349) (-3.011) (-0.347) (1.954) (-3.076) (0.369)
Elasticity 0.00329 -0.114*** -0.0569*** 0.00445 -0.0959*** -0.0250
(0.760) (-3.639) (-3.031) (0.896) (-3.726) (-1.353)
INC -5.48e-06*** 5.50e-05*** 1.39e-05** -3.90e-06*** 4.45e-05*** 6.77e-06
(-4.820) (6.483) (2.496) (-2.688) (6.721) (1.514)
UNEMP 1.019*** -1.898 -0.924 0.818** -3.540*** -3.198***
(3.753) (-1.145) (-0.955) (2.383) (-2.807) (-3.679)
logPOP 0.0237*** 0.955*** 0.984*** 0.00645 1.007*** 1.007***
(5.128) (32.60) (42.84) (1.438) (40.10) (51.87)
Constant -0.285 5.233*** -2.756* -0.162 2.292** -4.451***
(-1.547) (2.790) (-1.767) (-0.578) (2.504) (-4.216)
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
R-squared 0.619 0.917 0.946 0.361 0.937 0.936
S.E. Clustered by State State State State State State
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: The Effect of the Anti-Predatory Lending Law on Household Expenditure
Table 7 reports the regression results on household expenditures.
Yit = α+ αt + β ·APLi + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year. The years covered in the regression are 1998 to 2007. Household
expenditures by purpose are left-hand side variables. Panel A reports the regression results on total expenditures and panel
B reports the results on the expenditures by purpose. Panel C reports the results by subdividing the expenditure purposes in
panel B. The household expenditure data is from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). The CFED index is used for the
APL law variation. Control variables include annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rate (EFFINT),
supply elasticity (Elasticity), income per capita (INC), the unemployment rate (UNEMP), and the log numbers of population
(logPOP). Year dummy variables are included. For brevity, demographic control variables and year dummies are not reported.
The number of observations is 232. All standard errors are clustered by state. The table reports point estimates with robust
t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance. Economic significance is also reported. A
one-standard deviation increase in the APL law index is associated with a 0.28-standard deviation decline in total expenditures.
(A one-standard deviation increase in the APL law index is associated with a 2.73 [1 SD] x 754 [slope x -1] = 2058.42 decrease
in total expenditures, which is 2058.42 / 7475.56 = 0.28-standard deviation of DR.)
APL Econ Sig HPIAPP EFFINT Elasticity
Panel A : Total Expenditure
Average annual expenditures -754.0*** -0.28 -1,313 -7,029** 1,978*
(-3.035) (-0.109) (-2.224) (1.855)
Panel B : Expenditure by Purpose
Food -64.08** -0.21 1,366 -464.6 333.9***
(-2.272) (0.965) (-0.898) (3.086)
Alcoholic beverages -2.102 -0.04 -165.6 -87.05 -16.19
(-0.422) (-0.509) (-0.928) (-0.636)
Housing -273.1*** -0.23 -176.7 -3,210*** 42.24
(-2.970) (-0.0661) (-3.915) (0.169)
Apparel and services -32.14* -0.22 -307.6 32.11 140.6
(-2.050) (-0.349) (0.134) (1.526)
Transportation -173.0** -0.36 3,724 -1,811* 720.3*
(-2.865) (1.332) (-1.881) (2.047)
Healthcare -8.774 -0.05 -528.2 -159.2 94.52
(-0.468) (-0.603) (-0.547) (1.289)
Entertainment -35.96 -0.19 -1,410 -650.7 57.64
(-1.398) (-1.219) (-1.716) (0.486)
Personal care products and services -17.04*** -0.41 191.3 42.21 31.35
(-4.427) (1.060) (0.724) (1.202)
Reading -1.976 -0.12 -73.82 -45.35 -0.146
(-1.103) (-0.639) (-1.273) (-0.0126)
Education 13.75 0.11 -484.9 76.91 -67.81
(0.874) (-0.755) (0.492) (-1.032)
Tobacco products and smoking supplies 5.824 0.20 -145.6 117.3* -15.67
(1.224) (-0.691) (1.838) (-0.879)
Miscellaneous -25.38* -0.29 -340.4 -7.853 -28.53
(-1.980) (-0.788) (-0.0784) (-0.985)
Cash contributions -47.31* -0.23 -1,309 -87.80 169.6
(-2.007) (-0.835) (-0.254) (1.451)
Personal insurance and pensions -92.75* -0.20 -1,651 -775.3* 516.0**
(-1.886) (-0.880) (-1.961) (2.385)
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Table 7 (continued)
Panel C : Expenditure by Detailed Purpose
APL Econ Sig HPIAPP EFFINT Elasticity
Food
Food at home -28.88 -0.17 1,447* -129.5 97.03
(-1.364) (1.777) (-0.337) (1.207)
Cereals and bakery products -1.122 -0.05 176.3 -1.432 11.94
(-0.329) (1.299) (-0.0258) (0.887)
Meats, poultry, fish, and eggs -0.998 -0.02 545.4** 76.77 17.34
(-0.214) (2.248) (0.923) (0.561)
Dairy products -3.077 -0.15 197.6 -5.694 6.179
(-0.953) (1.507) (-0.0992) (0.529)
Fruits and vegetables -10.69*** -0.27 281.4 -17.30 -2.364
(-3.645) (1.456) (-0.224) (-0.132)
Other food at home -12.96 -0.17 246.6 -181.9 63.88*
(-1.368) (0.753) (-1.192) (1.913)
Food away from home -35.19*** -0.21 -79.71 -334.7 236.9**
(-3.284) (-0.0803) (-1.476) (2.468)
Housing
Shelter -217.9*** -0.23 675.8 -2,641*** -335.6
(-2.977) (0.313) (-3.759) (-1.310)
Owned dwellings -108.4* -0.18 -1,140 -1,068** -164.9
(-1.773) (-0.771) (-2.120) (-0.975)
Rented dwellings -106.4** -0.29 2,506 -1,485*** -136.8
(-2.242) (1.229) (-3.331) (-0.687)
Other lodging -3.028 -0.04 -691.9 -87.43 -33.85
(-0.519) (-1.311) (-0.623) (-1.003)
Utilities, fuels, and public services 27.97* 0.14 -393.5 474.2*** 230.0***
(1.765) (-0.561) (3.005) (2.899)
Household operations -24.19* -0.21 -490.5 -517.3** 44.02
(-1.872) (-0.625) (-2.778) (0.939)
Housekeeping supplies -8.687 -0.24 58.60 70.63 13.22
(-1.620) (0.194) (1.259) (0.626)
Household furnishings and equipment -50.30** -0.36 -26.61 -595.8* 90.63
(-2.273) (-0.0259) (-1.985) (0.985)
Transportation
Vehicle purchases (net outlay) -55.10 -0.17 2,949 -1,384** 478.1*
(-1.322) (1.491) (-2.124) (1.914)
Gasoline and motor oil -28.45** -0.15 784.4** -256.8** 136.0**
(-2.606) (2.663) (-2.277) (2.755)
Other vehicle expenses -76.08*** -0.53 -68.31 -144.7 148.1*
(-4.303) (-0.0940) (-0.487) (1.753)
Public transportation -13.39 -0.17 57.25 -25.45 -41.96
(-1.094) (0.172) (-0.226) (-1.704)
Personal insurance and pensions
Life and other personal insurance -2.523 -0.06 -109.9 72.24 37.98**
(-0.401) (-0.481) (1.223) (2.675)
Pensions and Social Security -90.19* -0.19 -1,540 -847.6** 478.0**
(-2.022) (-0.885) (-2.374) (2.277)
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Table 8: The Effect of the Amounts of Origination in Mortgage Refinancing on Household
Expenditure
Table 8 reports the regression results on household expenditures by purpose. The log amounts of origination (logAMTO) in
mortgage refinancing is instrumented by the APL. The CFED index is used for the APL law variation. F-statistics in the first
stage regression is significant with any level of significance (p-value=0.0000).
Yit = α+ αt + β · logAMTOIVit + γ0 ·HPIAPPit + γ1 · EFFINTit + γ2 · Elasticityi + θ ·Xit + it
where the i and t index, respectively, represent MSA and year. The years covered in the regression are 1998 to 2007. Household
expenditures by purpose are left-hand side variables. Panel A reports the regression results on the total expenditure and panel
B reports the results on the expenditures by purpose. The household expenditure data is from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES). Control variables include annual home price appreciation (HPIAPP), state-level mortgage rates (EFFINT),
supply elasticity (Elasticity), income per capita (INC), the unemployment rate (UNEMP), and the log numbers of population
(logPOP). Year dummy variables are included. For brevity, demographic control variables and year dummies are not reported.
The number of observations is 232. All standard errors are clustered by state. The table reports point estimates with robust
t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
logAMTOIV HPIAPP EFFINT Elasticity
Panel A : Total Expenditure
Average annual expenditures 15,978* -26,664 9,878 4,015
(1.699) (-0.996) (0.724) (1.279)
Panel B : Expenditure by the Purpose
Food 1,358* -788.5 972.3 507.0**
(1.809) (-0.358) (0.852) (2.043)
Alcoholic beverages 44.54 -236.2 -39.92 -10.51
(0.427) (-0.805) (-0.248) (-0.380)
Housing 5,788* -9,359 2,915 780.1
(1.820) (-1.102) (0.675) (0.748)
Apparel and services 681.0 -1,388 752.7 227.4
(1.344) (-0.944) (0.976) (1.586)
Transportation 3,666* -2,093 2,068 1,188
(1.888) (-0.320) (0.670) (1.410)
Healthcare 185.9 -823.2 37.55 118.2
(0.448) (-0.840) (0.0607) (1.247)
Entertainment 762.0 -2,619 155.6 154.8
(1.088) (-1.460) (0.158) (0.897)
Personal care products and services 361.2** -381.7 424.4 77.40
(1.980) (-0.730) (1.410) (1.107)
Reading 41.88 -140.3 -1.028 5.193
(1.057) (-0.937) (-0.0182) (0.452)
Education -291.4 -22.53 -231.4 -105.0
(-1.046) (-0.0264) (-0.674) (-0.946)
Tobacco products and smoking supplies -123.4 50.18 -13.31 -31.41
(-1.482) (0.218) (-0.112) (-1.019)
Miscellaneous 537.9 -1,194 561.3 40.05
(1.406) (-1.199) (1.165) (0.407)
Cash contributions 1,003 -2,900 973.1 297.4
(1.364) (-1.405) (0.895) (1.361)
Personal insurance and pensions 1,965 -4,770 1,304 766.6
(1.319) (-1.308) (0.635) (1.498)
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Figure 1: The MSA-level CFED index
Figure 1 reports the MSA-level CFED index on a map of the United States. For applying the state-level law indices to the
MSA-level analysis, the state-level law indices are mapped into a MSA-level variable. First, for those MSAs within a state, the
state law index has been assigned. Second, for those MSAs across several different states, a population-weighted state index
has been assigned.
The CFED Index
0.0 - 0.6
0.7 - 3.1
3.2 - 6.0
6.1 - 9.0
9.1 - 12.0
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Figure 2: The Mortgage Rate and Home Mortgage Origination
Figure 2 reports the amounts of origination (AMTO) and the denial rate (DR) with the 30-year mortgage rate. Using the
HMDA data, the U.S. aggregate AMTO and the U.S. average DR are reported by loan purpose. The conventional, conforming
30-year fixed-rate from the Primary Mortgage Market Survey by Freddie Mac is used. In panel A, the AMTO in mortgage
refinancing and in home purchases are compared with the 30-year mortgage rate. In panel B, the DR in mortgage refinancing
and in home purchases are compared with the 30-year mortgage rate.
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Figure 3: The Home Price Index and Home Mortgage Origination
Figure 3 reports the amounts of origination (AMTO) and the denial rate (DR) with the Home Price Index. Using the HMDA
data, the U.S. aggregate AMTO and the U.S. average DR are reported by loan purpose. The U.S. national HPI from FHFA is
used. In panel A, the AMTO in mortgage refinancing and in home purchases are compared with the HPI. In panel B, the DR
in mortgage refinancing and in home purchases are compared with the HPI.
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Figure 4: The Home Price Index by Elasticity of Housing Supply
Figure 4 reports time-series of the HPI by elasticity of the housing supply. By the elasticity of housing supply from Saiz (2010),
MSAs are divided into the elastic MSAs and the inelastic MSAs. The average HPIs of the groups are plotted. The base year
of the average HPI is 1980.
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Figure 5: By Elasticity of Housing Supply
Figure 5 reports a time series of the amounts of origination (AMTO) and the denial rate (DR) by elasticity of the housing
supply. By the elasticity of housing supply from Saiz (2010), MSAs are divided into the elastic MSAs and the inelastic MSAs.
Panel A reports a time-series of the AMTO by the supply elasticity and the loan purpose. Panel B reports a time-series of the
DR by the supply elasticity and the loan purpose.
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